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of New Zealand bankruptcy law to reflect recent socio-
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competing public interest factors, such as the purpose
of insolvency law, the role of the state in insolvency law,
and the necessary balance to be struck between
competing macroeconomic and microeconomic factors.
The author suggests varying solutions-some
educational, and some legal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The law governing personal insolvency in New Zealand is the
Insolvency Act 1967.1 That Act repealed and replaced the Bankruptcy Act
1908,2 which had been modelled on nineteenth century English
legislation.3 Although enacted in 1967, the Insolvency Act 1967 did not
come into force until 1 January 1971, after subordinate legislation had
been passed.4 Credit cards were not introduced into New Zealand until
1981.5 In the last ten years, the total value of credit card sales has
increased from about $2.6 billion in 1988 to about $6.9 billion in 1997.6
Although New Zealand was late in joining the "cashless society,"
it has rapidly embraced the concept. Credit cards, Electronic Funds
Transfer at Point of Sale (EFrPOS),7 and telephone banking have become
important features of contemporary New Zealand society. There were
1,447 operating bank branches in New Zealand in 1995, compared with
1,094 branches in 1997. Because of the reduction in the number of
branches, many redundancies have occurred. In contrast, the number of
automatic teller machines rose from 1,419 in 1995 to 1,513 in 1997.8
New Zealand now has one EFTPOS terminal for every 63 people. 9
Approximately 340 million EFFPOS transactions took place in the year to
1 [1967] 1 N.Z. Stat. 462, No. 54. For commentaries, see P.D. McKenzie, ed., Spratt and
McKenzie's Law of Insolvency, 2d ed. (Wellington, N.Z.: Butterworths, 1972) [hereinafter Sprat and
McKenzie's Law of Insolvency]; and The Laws of New Zealand (Wellington, N.Z.: Butterworths,
1994) "Insolvency" [hereinafter Laws NZ]. Company liquidations are governed by the Companies
Act 1993, [1993] 3 N.Z. Stat. 2256, No. 105.
2 [1957] 1 N.Z. Stat. Rep. 427, No. 12.
3 See generally F.C. Spratt, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in New Zealand (Wellington,
N.Z.: Butterworths, 1930).
4 See Insolvency Act Commencement Order 1970, S.R. 1970/244/2. See also Insolvency Rules
1970 S.R. 1970/245; Insolvency Regulations 1970, S.R. 1970/260; and Summary Instalment Orders
(District Courts) Rules 1970, RPT 1981/182.
5 See Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998 (Wellington, N.Z.:
Government Printer, 1998) at 507 [hereinafter Yearbook].
6 Ibid.
7 EFrPOS was introduced in New Zealand in 1984 as a means of payment for retail goods and
services. All banks agreed in 1990 to integrate their EFrPOS services, and growth since then has been
rapid. By December 1997, there were 59,952 EFTPOS terminals in use in New Zealand at
supermarkets, service stations, liquor merchants, and other retail outlets: see Yearbook, supra note 5
at 560.
8 Ibid, at 559.
9 See ibid.
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31 December 1997, representing an increase of about 30 per cent over
the approximately 260 million transactions in 1996. These figures include
the majority of credit card transactions, the balance of which were by
paper or telephone.10
Furthermore, the investment, finance, and banking industries
accounted for approximately $66 million worth of advertising
expenditures in 1997.11 The credit industry generally is regulated by the
Credit Contracts Act 1981,12 which is self-policing in nature. Unless
appropriate disclosure is made (whether initial, modification, or on
request), interest will be irrecoverable. 13
Many behavioural changes have occurred as a result of the
deregulation of the New Zealand financial sector, which started after the
general election of June 1984. Deregulation of the banking sector came
about in 1986 through legislation that established a framework for the
registration and prudential supervision of banks. 14 Deregulation of other
aspects of the financial sector followed. 15 The Insolvency Act 1967 was,
quite simply, never drafted for use in contemporary New Zealand
society.
In the year ending 31 March 1980, 530 persons were adjudged
bankrupt in New Zealand; by 30 June 1997, the annual number of
10 lbid.
11 Ibid. at 259.
12 [1981] 1 N.Z. Stat. 263, No. 27.
13 See generally Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Consumer Credit and Hire Purchase," which
discusses the relevant provisions of the Credit Contracts Act 1981, supra note 12.
14 See Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 1986, [1986] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1427, No. 131,
as am. by Reserve Bank of New ZealandAct 1989, [1989] 4 N.Z. Stat. 2544, No. 157. There are now
twenty registered banks in New Zealand, only four of which were former trading banks: see
Yearbook, supra note 5 at 557. Unlike in other countries, the new New Zealand banking legislation
provides no explicit protection of bank deposits. Under section 68 of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand Act 1989, the Reserve Bank is required to carry out its registration and prudential
supervision functions for the purposes of (1) "promoting the maintenance of a sound and efficient
financial system," or (2) "avoiding significant damage to the financial system that could result from
the failure of a registered bank." Similarly, there is no licensing of deposit-taking as an activity
within New Zealand. Neither is there any official deposit insurance by which losses of bank
depositors are borne by an insurance fund, and no priority is given to bank depositors on insolvency.
The approach to banking supervision also differs in New Zealand, which has a less prescriptive
regime than many other countries. The banking supervisory regime in New Zealand relies heavily
on market discipline, on the publication of disclosure documents, and on the requirement that
directors attest to the accuracy of information contained in such documents, to hold directors and
managing personnel accountable for the prudent and responsible management of a bank's fiscal
affairs. I am indebted to Sachin Zodgekar of Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young, Barristers &
Solicitors, for this summary.
15 See Part II and Part VI(B), below, for a discussion of these features.
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personal bankruptcies had reached 2,464.16 Between 1960 and 1980, the
number of bankruptcies remained reasonably stable, averaging 15 to 20
per 100,000 of population.1 7 By 1997, that figure had reached 70 per
100,000 of population.18
The New Zealand Income Support system provided support for
843,825 persons in the year ending 30 June 1997.19 The recipients
received benefits worth roughly NZ$10.6 billion, approximately 11.2 per
cent of New Zealand's gross domestic product.20 The recipients
represented approximately one in four of New Zealand's resident
population,21 meaning that roughly one-quarter of New Zealand's adult
population contributes little to the tax base for the provision of services
to New Zealanders.
Until 1983, the number of registered unemployed persons in
New Zealand remained below 50,000. In the early 1990s that figure, at
times, exceeded 200,000.22
All of this information needs to be considered in the context of a
country that consists of two main islands (the North Island and the
South Island) and a number of smaller islands (the largest of which are
Stewart Island and the Chatham Islands), and occupies an area that is
about 10,000 square miles more than the area of the United Kingdom
and Northern Ireland.23 The resident population of New Zealand at the
last census, conducted in 1996, was 3,681,546, of which approximately 1
million live in Auckland.24
Before I endeavour to draw together these statistics, I need to
provide some historical material of significance for assessing the issue of
consumer bankruptcy in New Zealand.
16 See Yearbook, supra note 5 at 497.
1 7 1bid. at 498.
18 Ibid
19 Ibid. at 142. The benefits payable to citizens include the unemployment benefit, sickness
benefit, domestic purposes benefit, family support, and the New Zealand superannuation and
veterans' pension.
2 0 Ibid. at 141.
21 Ibid at 142.
2 2 Ibid. at 311.
23 The land area of New Zealand is 103,736 square miles; that of the United Kingdom is
94,227 square miles.
24 See Yearbook, supra note 5 at 85, 89.
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II. A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY25
In June 1984, the National Party was in power in New Zealand
under the leadership of Sir Robert Muldoon. Historically, the National
Party has been a conservative party with values similar to the
Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and the Liberal/National
Coalition in Australia. However, in the years leading up to 1984,
protectionist policies were implemented that stifled economic growth.
By early 1984, interest, rents, prices, and wages had all been frozen by
regulations passed by the government through executive orders in
council made under the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948.26
The Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 had been used for many
years to regulate most sectors of the New Zealand economy by executive
order. The regulation-making powers contained in section 11 of the Act
were widely framed. The wording of the section allowed the governor
general to make such regulations as appeared to him necessary for the
economic stability of the country. In order to hold that a regulation
adopted under the Act was ultra vires, a court was required to find that
the regulation could not reasonably be considered necessary or
expedient for the economic stability of New Zealand, or that it was
unrelated to the purposes of the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948.27
By 1984, New Zealand probably had one of the most regulated
economies in the democratic western world. Its economy had also
deteriorated to such an extent that, on 31 March 1984, its total public
debt was approximately $21.9 billion, a sum equal to 64.7 per cent of the
gross domestic product.28
In the 1981 election, the National Party was returned with only a
one seat majority. For various reasons (mostly unconnected with
economic policy), there was so much dissension within the party that Sir
25 What follows is substantially based on an unpublished article by the author: see P. Heath,
"Entry and Exit: Investment Credit and Insolvency Issues in the Asia/Pacific Region: New Zealand"
(International Bar Association Conference, Melbourne, Australia, October 1994) [unpublished].
26 [1948] 1 N.Z. Stat. 347, No. 38.
27 See NZ Shop Employees Industrial Assn of Workers v. Attorney-General, [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R.
521 at 529, 535 (C.A.). The Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 was repealed in 1987 as part of New
Zealand's economic reform: see Economic Stabilisation Act Repeal Act 1987, [1987] 2 N.Z. Stat.
1317, No. 126, s. 2.
28 See New Zealand, Office of the Minister of Finance, Economic Management (Wellington,
N.Z.: Office of the Minister of Finance, 1984) at 81, online: New Zealand Treasury <http://www.
treasury.govt.nzlpubslbmblbrief84/contents.htm> (date accessed: 13 August 1999). Of the total
public debt, $9.4 billion was owed externally in foreign currency: ibid.
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Robert Muldoon found it necessary to call a snap general election on 14
June 1984. Following that election, on 14 July 1984, a new Labour
government, under David Lange's leadership, was elected to power. Like
its counterparts in Australia and the United Kingdom, the New Zealand
Labour Party had been seen as associated with the trade union
movement and socialist policies generally. That perception of the
Labour Party was to change dramatically.
In the following nine months, a series of events transformed New
Zealand from one of the most heavily regulated economies in the
Western world to one of the least regulated economies. One of the first
steps taken by the government was to devalue the New Zealand dollar by
20 per cent, in order to stem the massive outflow of foreign exchange
during the period between the announcement of the election and the
election itself. The freeze on interest rates was lifted almostimmediately; controls on wages, prices, and rents were also subsequently
removed. By 2 March 1985, New Zealand had floated its dollar on the
foreign exchange markets. Although these changes were implemented
because there were no other realistic options, they still could not have
taken place without two significant, yet fortuitous, events.
The first event was the election of a Labour government, which
took office facing a grave economic crisis. In order to cope with the
crisis, the government quickly deprived New Zealand's main export
earners (the rural sector) of their subsidies, and farmers were forced to
bear increasing interest payments while the economy was being
restructured. It is extremely unlikely that those steps would have been
taken under a National Government, because the rural sector comprised
a significant portion of the National Party's constituency. However, the
changes that were made were both fundamental and necessary, and they
have forced New Zealand farmers to become more efficient and
competitive.
Second, just as it would have been unlikely for the National Party
to embark upon a restructuring of the rural economy, it was equally
unlikely that the Labour Party would enact legislation deregulating the
labour market. This did not occur until the National Party was returned
to power at the 1990 general election. In 1991, reform of the labour
market, in a manner consistent with other economic reforms, was
achieved through passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.29
29 [1991] 1 N.Z. Stat. 184, No. 22. The long title to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 states
that the Act is "to promote an efficient labour market" and, in particular,
(a) To provide for freedom of association:
(b) To allow employees to determine who should represent their interests in relation to
1999] A New Zealand Perspective
The economic reforms from 1984 had the long-term objective of
returning New Zealand to prosperity by laying the groundwork for a
future recovery. This was done by completely overhauling the public
service,30 reforming the banking system,31 reforming structures used to
operate the ports and the energy sector,32 and introducing the profit
motive for trading entities operated by the government. In place of state-
controlled trading entities, the government introduced the concept of
state-owned enterprises to run such ventures with a view to profit for the
government as shareholder.33
employment issues:
(c) To enable each employee to choose either-
(i) To negotiate an individual employment contract with his or her employer, or
(ii) To be bound by a collective employment contract to which his or her employer is
a party:
(d) To enable each employer to choose-
(i) To negotiate an individual employment contract with any employee:
(ii) To negotiate or to elect to be bound by a collective employment contract that
binds 2 or more employees:
(e) To establish that the question of whether employment contracts are individual or
collective or both is itself a matter for negotiation by the parties themselves ....
The Employment Tribunal was set up as a specialist tribunal to resolve disputes founded on
employment contracts, and the Employment Court was created to act as an appellate court from the
Employment Tribunal and was also given certain original jurisdiction. Under section 3(1) of the Act,
and subject to specific provisions of theAct, the tribunal and the court have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine disputes based on an employment contract. An appeal lies from the
Employment Court directly to the Court of Appeal (thus bypassing the High Court) but generally
only on questions of law: see section 135 of the Act.
30 The State SectorAct 1988, [1988] 1 N.Z. Stat. 224, No. 20 replaced the State Services Act
1962, [1962] 2 N.Z. Stat. 832, No. 132 and a number of other enactments dealing with the public
service. The new Act provides for the appointment of chief executives to run the departments, and
allows the chief executives to be appointed from the private sector. The provisions have, to a large
extent, removed the power of the public service to influence the implementation of government
policy.
31 Reference has already been made to the reforms achieved by the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand Amendment Act 1986, supra note 14, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989, supra
note 14. The latter Act devised a mechanism for policy objectives to be agreed upon with the
governors of the Reserve Bank. The policy objectives include the maintenance of a low rate of
inflation. The new regulation of the banking system led to the increase of services made available to
banking customers of the type already outlined.
32 See Port Companies Act 1988, [1988] 1 N.Z. Stat. 592, No. 91; and the Energy Companies Act
1992, [1992] 2 N.Z. Stat. 859, No. 56.
33 See State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, [1986] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1306, No. 124.
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III. THE 1967 BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS
The enactment of the Insolvency Act 1967 was not preceded by
any fundamental review of insolvency law in New Zealand. Rather, the
review of the 1908 legislation drew more on English34 and Australian 35
law reform reports. The Act was designed to liberalize bankruptcy
concepts in New Zealand. 36
Before considering the reforms enacted in 1967, it is necessary to
say something about terminology. "Bankruptcy" is a term of art. It refers
to the status of a person, not a corporation, who either files a debtor's
petition in bankruptcy, or is adjudged bankrupt by the High Court on
the petition of a creditor. 37 In contrast, the term "insolvency" denotes a
state of things. It means the inability of a person to pay debts from his or
her own resources as they fall due.38 As Peter Blanchard 39 said in a
commentary on the unreported decision of Richardson J. in Re
Northridge Properties Limited,40 the thrust of this concept is not to
require a person to keep in cash a sum sufficient to meet all outstanding
indebtedness, however distant the date of payment may be. Rather, it is
to have assets available that, if realized, will produce sufficient money to
3 4 See U.K., Bankruptcy Law Amendment Committee, Report of the Committee on Bankruptcy
Law and Deeds of Arrangement Law Amendment, Cmnd 221 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1957).
35 See Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Attorney General
of the Commonwealth to Review the Bankruptcy Law of the Commonwealth (Canberra: Government
Printer, 1962).
3 6 See generally E.H. Flitton, "The Insolvency Act, 1967" [1968] N.Z.LJ. 394; P.D. McKenzie,
"Insolvency Act 1967" (1968-69) 3 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 210; and Spratt and McKenzie's Law of Insolvency,
supra note 1 at 1-6.
37 A debtor's petition may be filed under section 21 of the Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1,
while the prerequisites for an adjudication in bankruptcy by the court, on a petition brought by a
creditor, is governed by section 23 of theAct. The power to make an order of adjudication is found
in section 26 of the Act.
38 See Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," para. 1. See also Attorney-General for British
Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1937] A.C. 391 (P.C.); Rees v. Bank of New South Wales
(1964), 111 C.L.R. 210 at 218 (H.C.A.); Ebbett v. Official Assignee in Bankruptcy, [1991] 4
N.Z.B.L.C. 99-249 (H.C.); and Re Gladding King Real Estate Ltd (in liquidation), [1993] M.C.L.R.
204 at 220 (H.C.). Finally, see Re Northridge Properties Limited (13 December 1977), Auckland M
46/75 (N.Z. S.C.), in which there is a useful discussion of the problems that are caused when
conversions of assets into money extends beyond two or three weeks, at which point another set of
debts is likely to fall due. Regrettably, this decision has never been reported, although relevant
extracts from the case may be found in "Insolvency and Companies" Comment [1983] N.Z.L.J. 44.
39 Now Justice Blanchard of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.
4 0 Supra note 38.
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pay all indebtedness, and ensure that funds are still available to meet
other indebtedness as it matures.41 This observation is relevant to those
who use credit cards. Using available credit lines to meet present debts,
but having insufficient ability to pay the credit card debt and the high
interest that will consequently accrue, is likely to mean that the debtor is
insolvent for the purpose of that definition.
For the first time, the Insolvency Act 1967 allowed a debtor to
make a formal proposal to creditors to satisfy indebtedness that could
operate outside the bankruptcy regime, and enable the debtor to avoid
the stigma of bankruptcy. This was achieved through Part XV of the Act,
which provided the debtor with a flexible mechanism for making
proposals to creditors that required approval by specified majorities of
creditors, and the sanction of the High Court.42 Also, a procedure
known as a summary instalment order was introduced to deal with
debtors whose indebtedness was relatively small; even now, it applies
only to persons who have debts of less than $12,000.43 It is a useful
provision in concept, but is infrequently used because of the costs
involved and the very low level of debt to which it relates.
In addition, the focus of bankruptcy administration moved from
being quasi-penal in nature4 4 towards the dual purpose of (1)
maximizing returns to creditors, and (2) rehabilitating the debtor.
However, there was little of substance to support the second objective,
other than a change in the law that made it easier to obtain a discharge
from bankruptcy.45
Finding that critical balance between maximizing returns to
creditors, and the need to rehabilitate a debtor-while also dealing
appropriately with commercially undesirable behaviour-is much the
same problem identified in the preface of the recent report of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission to the United States
Congress, which is "the need to maintain-and, in some instances, to
41 See also Bank ofAustralasia v. Hall (1907), 4 C.L.R. 1514 at 1543 (H.C.A.), Isaacs J.
42 See generally Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," paras. 449-75. See also A. Sawyer,
"Proposing an Alternative to Bankruptcy: Part XV in Retrospect" (1995) 6 Canta. L. Rev. 175; and
P. Heath, "Proposals Under Part XV Insolvency Act: Is the Public Interest Relevant?" [1991]
N.Z.L.J. 52.
43 See Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, ss. 146-52, as am. by Insolvency Amendment Act 1990,
[1990] 1 N.Z. Stat. 92, No. 7, s. 6. See also Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Creditors' Remedies," paras.
125-30.
4 4 See, for example, Re Davies (1907), 26 N.Z.L.R. 254 (S.C.).
45 Compare sections 107-10 of the Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, with section 127 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1908, supra note 2.
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restore, balance [between the interests of creditors and debtors]." 46 It
can not, of course, be said that the Insolvency Act 1967 was intended
specifically to deal with what is now known as the "consumer bankrupt."
Such a person was unknown in New Zealand in 1967. The complications
of life brought about by the move towards a cashless society, together
with other deregulating activity in New Zealand that has removed the
government's paternalistic approach towards its citizens, have exposed
the problems we are grappling with today.
Nevertheless, it can be said that the changes introduced in 1967
to allow automatic discharge from bankruptcy are equally relevant to
consumer bankruptcies. Generally speaking, a person will be discharged
from bankruptcy after the expiry of three years from the date of
adjudication. 47 It is open, however, to the Official Assignee (the public
official charged with the duty of administering bankrupt estates) or a
creditor (with the leave of the High Court) to object to a discharge.48 If
an objection is raised, the Court will then consider, in determining
whether to grant or to refuse an order of discharge, the affairs of the
bankrupt; the causes of the bankruptcy; the manner in which the
bankrupt has performed duties imposed upon him or her under the
Insolvency Act 1967 or obeyed orders of the court; the bankrupt's
conduct both before and after bankruptcy; and any other fact, matter, or
circumstance that would assist the court in making its decision.49 In Re
Anderson, Penlington J. emphasized the need for a proper investigation
of all the facts and circumstances of the particular bankruptcy.0 In
considering whether an application for discharge should succeed, the
court should have regard to the interests of the bankrupt, the creditors,
and the public. In the context of the public interest, the court should
consider questions of commercial morality and whether the bankrupt
had engaged in fraudulent or dishonest behaviour, recklessness, or gross
negligence. A synonym for "commercial morality" would be
"undesirable commercial behaviour."51
46 National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, Final Report
(United States: Government Printing Office, 1997) at i, online: National Bankruptcy Review
Commission <http:llwww.nbrc.gov/reportcont.html> (date accessed: 7 July 1999).
4 7 See lnsolvency Act 1967,supra note 1, s. 107(1).
48 Ibid. s. 107(3).
4 9 Ibid. s. 109(2).
5 0 See Re Anderson (14 April 1992), Hamilton B 213189 (N.Z. H.C.).
51 Ibid.
436
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A bankrupt may also seek a discharge from bankruptcy before
the three year period expires. If such an application is made, the same
criteria that apply to objections to a discharge must be taken into
consideration by the court.52 The court may make absolute orders of
discharge or impose terms on the discharge.53
A discharge from bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all
debts provable in the bankruptcy, with specified exceptions.54 Debts that
are not released on discharge include (1) liability incurred by means of
fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the bankrupt was a party;ss
(2) any debt or liability for which the bankrupt has obtained forbearance
by any fraud to which the bankrupt was a party;56 (3) any judgment debt
or amount payable under a contribution order or order of discharge for
which the bankrupt is liable;5 7 (4) any amount payable under a
maintenance order made under the Family Proceedings Act 1980;58 and
(5) any amount payable under the Child Support Act 1991.59 A secured
creditor will continue to have rights under the security, even after
discharge from bankruptcy.60 Debts not provable in bankruptcy include 61
(a) claims for future spousal or child maintenance, 62 (b) claims against
minors,63 and (c) claims which should not be admitted for public policy
reasons.64
52 See Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, ss. 108-09. Concerning discharges from bankruptcy,
see generally Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," paras. 410-29.
53 See Insolvency Act 1967,supra note 1, s. 110.
541bid. s. 114. See also Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," para. 424. Note that the bankrupt
is released from all debts provable in the bankruptcy, not only debts proved in the bankruptcy: see
Perrott v. Newton King Ltd, [1933] N.Z.L.R. 1131 at 1152 (C.A.) [hereinafter Perrott].
55 See Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, s. 114(a).
56Ibid. s. 114(b).
5 7 Ibid. s. 114(c). A "contribution order" is an order for payment of monies to the Official
Assignee out of the wages of a bankrupt.
58 Ibid. s. 114(d), as am. by Family Proceedings Act 1980, [1980] 2 N.Z. Stat. 862, No. 94, s.
189(1).
59 See Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, s. 114(e), as am. by Child Support Act 1991, [1991] 3
N.Z. Stat. 1732, No. 142, s. 252.
60 See Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, s. 3(3). See also Lamont v. Bank of New Zealand,
[1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 142 (H.C.), in which the court distinguished Perrott, supra note 54.
61 See generally Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," para. 351.
62 See Re Davidson, Ex Parte Davidson (1882), N.Z.L.R. 2 S.C. 55.
63 See Minors' Contracts Act 1969, [1969] 1 N.Z. Stat. 402, No. 41, s. 6.
64 This includes claims with an element of fraud: see Re Sullivan (1904), 7 G.L.R. 376 (S.C.).
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Provisions also exist that enable the court to place prohibitions
on bankrupts from continuing in business on their own account, or being
directly or indirectly involved in the management of a company after the
debtor's discharge from bankruptcy. These provisions are aimed at
protecting the commercial community rather than penalizing the
bankrupt.65
IV. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN NEW ZEALAND:
FACTS AND PRACTICE
No separate statistics are kept of consumer bankruptcies in New
Zealand. The New Zealand Insolvency and Trustee Service, which is
part of the Ministry of Commerce, treats bankruptcies as falling into
"complex" and "non-complex" categories. "Non-complex" bankruptcies
generally arise when (1) assets are under $10,000 in value; (2) liabilities
are no more than $100,000; and (3) there are no contentious issues. This
general categorization is not dissimilar from the definition of "consumer
debtor" in section 66.11 of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act66
which, in dealing with consumer proposals, refers to a maximum debt
level of C$75,000 or such other maximum sum as may be prescribed by
regulation.
Not all "non-complex" bankruptcies will be consumer
bankruptcies. All that I can do here is to estimate the number of
consumer bankruptcies in New Zealand. An experienced former Official
Assignee has informed me that approximately 60 per cent of all personal
bankruptcies fall within the consumer bankruptcy rubric, but this begs
the question of how one defines a consumer bankrupt. Subject to this
caveat, reproduced below is a table of personal bankruptcies, which has
been updated by reference to statistics provided to me recently by the
Ministry of Commerce for the 1998 year.
65 For the practical application of these provisions, see the following cases dealing with
comparable provisions in the Companies Act 1955, [1955] 1 N.Z. Stat. 569, No. 63: Ramsay v.
Sumich, [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 628 (H.C.), Sinclair J.; and Re Focas & Ors, [1993] 6 N.Z.C.L.C. 96-595
(H.C.), Jaine J.
66 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter m].
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TABLE 1
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES
Year Ended 30 June Number
1980* 530
1985* 849
1990 1,900
1991 2,052
1992 2,837
1993 2,532
1994 2,312
1995 1,963
1996 2,158
1997 2,464
1998t 2,974
Source: Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998
(Wellington, N.Z.: Government Printer, 1998) at 497.
* Year ended 31 March.
t 1998 data supplied by the Ministry of Commerce.
Apart from the 1980 and 1985 figures (which are included for
historical purposes), it can be seen that, between 1990 and 1998, the
number of bankruptcies in New Zealand rose from 1,900 to 2,974, an
increase of 1,074 or almost 50 per cent. Further, the June 1998 figure is
the highest number of bankruptcies recorded in New Zealand. Assuming
a stable ratio of consumer bankruptcies to total bankruptcies, the
percentage increase in consumer bankruptcies will also have been in the
order of 50 per cent.
Returning to the credit card statistics mentioned earlier, we find
that, in 1990, the total value of credit card sales was $3.2 billion,
compared to the total outstanding advances of $951 million. The ratio of
outstanding advances to the total value of credit card sales in 1990 was
30.1 per cent. In 1997, the total value of credit card sales was $6.9 billion,
compared to outstanding total advances of 1.9 billion, or 27.5 per cent of
the total.67 These figures represent the annual value of sales by credit
cards issued by all registered banks in New Zealand together with
American Express and Diners Club.68
What the credit card sales statistics do not reveal is how many
individuals have refinanced elsewhere in order to pay off credit card
6 7 See Yearbook, supra note 5 at 507.
681bid.
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indebtedness running at a higher rate of interest. The current average
credit card interest rate in New Zealand is around 18 per cent per
annum.
All that can be gathered from the official statistics is that about
one-third of all credit card debt remains outstanding, and accumulating
interest at a high rate. Most of that money goes overseas, since 95 per
cent of the assets of New Zealand banks are owned offshore.69 Both of
the major credit card companies, American Express and Diners Club,
are also owned offshore.
In New Zealand's changing social environment in the post-
deregulation era, there is an increasing gap between the wealthy and the
poor. The "trickle down" theory appears not to have worked. In
November 1997, the average weekly income was between $630.19 and
$657.75 per week (gross), depending upon whether overtime was
available for the particular employee.70 Mention has already been made
of the fact that almost one in every four New Zealanders receives some
form of state benefit allowance.
V. INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW
In December 1988, the (then) Law Reform Division of the
Department of Justice released a discussion paper entitled Insolvency
Law Reform.71 Submissions were sought by 15 February 1989. The
review contemplated by that discussion paper has not yet taken place.
The Ministry of Commerce (which is responsible for insolvency law in
New Zealand) is about to embark on an insolvency law review which,
hopefully, will lead to new legislation in, or shortly after, the year 2000.
Accordingly, issues of the type discussed in this symposium are truly
timely from a New Zealand perspective.
I am not in a position to add anything of substance to the
question of how consumer bankruptcies should be administered, having
regard to the legislation currently in force in New Zealand. I propose,
therefore, in the next part of this article, to consider the options
available to New Zealand to address consumer bankruptcy issues more
adequately in its reform of bankruptcy law.
69 Based on figures to the end of December 1997, published in Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
Financial Statistics (June 1998) at 78-84.
70 See Yearbook, supra note 5 at'319.
71 See New Zealand, Law Reform Division, Insolvency Law Reform: A Discussion Paper
(Wellington, N.Z.: Department of Justice, 1988).
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VI. SOME THOUGHTS ON LAW REFORM
A. Purpose of Insolvency Law
The overriding purpose of insolvency law is to determine which
of two or more innocent parties should bear a loss. It is implicit in the
fact of insolvency that there is not enough money to go around. Thus, it
is necessary for the law to make clear choices and to draw lines which
may, in any given case, seem harsh. There are many tensions in this
particular area of law. How should the rights of a spouse and children be
weighed against the right of a creditor to receive payment of a due debt?
What justification is there for requiring certain debts (i.e., wages owing
to the debtor's employees) to be paid in priority to other unsecured
debts? These are difficult questions, but ones that must be addressed all
the same. If they are not addressed, then certain economic consequences
may follow, some of which may not be beneficial from a community
perspective. It is in this context that one must consider the role of the
state.
B. Role of the State
The role of the state clearly goes beyond establishing an
insolvency law framework. In our increasingly cashless society, the basics
of budgeting should be the starting point. Not so long ago, very little was
purchased with credit; much of a family's supplies were acquired with
cash. In the current environment, it is important to educate children
about the responsibilities involved in budgeting one's finances. In turn,
that education should teach the value of thrift.
However, a balance must also be struck between the macro-
economic need for consumption to maintain the buoyancy of the
economy, and the need of individuals to budget wisely so that a buffer is
available to cushion unforeseen financial reverses. Governments also
need to strike a balance in their competing demands for spending (at a
macro-economic level) and thrift (i.e., for retirement saving).
Governments must determine the values they wish to instil. Trustees in
bankruptcy who are left to "counsel" debtors are doing little more than
applying sticking plasters when the patient is seriously ill. The state has
an obligation to educate its citizens in the prudent use of credit so that
good judgement will be exercised in determining when to spend and
when to save.
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Like many other countries engaged in financial deregulation,
New Zealand has adopted the "user pay" principle. Regulation 63 of the
Insolvency Regulations 1970 provides that "[w]here a bankrupt has no
available assets, the Assignee shall not be required to incur any expense
in relation to his estate without guarantee from the creditors, or some of
them." 72 The Official Assignee is a public servant employed by the
Ministry of Commerce.73 Public interest duties are imposed on Official
Assignees by the Insolvency Act 1967: the decision whether or not to
request a public examination of a bankrupt applying for a discharge is
one;74 the right to apply to the court for business prohibition orders7S is
another. In my view, the state's duty to prosecute commercial crimes is a
third. 76
It is useful to consider what was said in the World Bank's report
in 1997.77 The World Bank's view was that "five fundamental tasks lie at
the core of every Government's mission, without which sustainable,
shared, poverty-reducing development is impossible." 78 These five
fundamental tasks are (1) establishing a foundation of law; (2)
maintaining a non-distortionary policy environment, including macro-
economic stability; (3) investing in basic social services and
infrastructure; (4) protecting the vulnerable; and (5) protecting the
environment. The Report continues by pointing out that a survey
commissioned especially for the World Bank, comprised of domestic
entrepieneurs in 69 countries, confirmed anecdotal evidence that many
countries lack the basic institutional foundations for market
development. The Report continues:
High levels of crime and personal violence and an unpredictable judiciary combined to
produce what this Report defines as the "lawlessness syndrome." Weak and arbitrary
state institutions often compound the problem with unpredictable inconsistent behaviour.
Far from assisting the growth of markets, such actions squander the State's credibility and
hurt market development. 7 9
7 2 Supra note 4.
73 In fact, section 15 of the Insolvency Act 1967, supra note 1, requires all Official Assignees to
be salaried state servants. See also Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," para. 159.
7 4 See lnsolvencyAct 1967, supra note 1, s. 109.
75Ibid. s. 111.
76 Ibid. s. 129.
77 See The World Bank, World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997) [hereinafter "Report"].
78 Ibid. at 4.
79 Ibid.
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There must be an incentive for people to pay their debts. It is a
fundamental premise of the law of contract that people will honour their
bargains. This translates in many cases to payment for goods or services
received. If a debtor knows that if assets are divested, no investigation
will follow unless the creditors are prepared to throw good money after
bad, the debtor has little incentive to behave honestly. There are
economic as well as social imperatives requiring state intervention to
ensure adherence to these standards; these imperatives are, in truth, no
different from the need for an independent police force to enforce the
standards laid down by the criminal law.
The first question, therefore, is whether there is a need for the
state to take a lead role, either within or outside of its insolvency law
system, to provide education facilities to those who lack budgeting skills,
and to provide appropriate incentives to people to pay their bills. A
debtor who has the ability to manage his or her own budget should not,
it seems to me, be encouraged to view the prospect of bankruptcy as a
means of garnering assets for which he or she has not paid by disposing
of assets (directly) for his or her family's benefit, and (indirectly) for the
purpose of avoiding contractual obligations that the debtor had
promised to keep. In my view, governments have a strong interest in
developing policies in this area to provide incentives for both established
and developing free markets, and to ensure that adequate funding will
be available to implement those policies.
C. Definitional Problems: What is a "Consumer Bankrupt"?
The next issue concerns the definition of the term "consumer
bankrupt." At one level, a consumer bankrupt can be defined as any
person who has become bankrupt through means other than business
activity. At another level, a consumer bankrupt may be defined as a
person, whether in business on his or her own account or in partnership
who, through lack of budgetary skills, has been unable to pay his or her
debts. Such a person may be on a high or low income. Some low-income
earners are thrifty. Some high-income earners are spendthrifts. A third
possibility is the arbitrary use of a dollar value of liabilities to determine
whether a bankrupt should be classified as a consumer bankrupt.8 0
It may not matter which of the first two definitions is used. The
third definition causes problems, because it assumes that all
bankruptcies falling under a prescribed dollar amount are due to the
80 See, for example, BIA, supra note 66, s. 66.11, which provides the definition of "consumer
debtor" for the purposes of Part III, Division 2 of the Act.
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same causes: a proposition that cannot be sustained. An example is a
failed small business operated as a company that is placed in liquidation
for reasons other than fraud or mismanagement, and where the directors
have guaranteed the company's debts. What is important in dealing with
bankruptcies is to address their underlying problems.
The underlying problem in a consumer bankruptcy is the
inability to manage debt in our increasingly cashless society. The
temptation to buy goods or services one cannot otherwise afford
(because of insufficient cash) is greater because of our increasing access
to credit. The poor exponent of the art of budgeting does not allow for
the inevitable interest bills that follow; or indeed, for the ongoing cost of
maintaining the value of the goods that have been acquired on credit.
As I suggested earlier, education at the school level may be part
of the prescription. By the time the insolvency administrator appears on
the scene, the doctor who, by proper diagnosis and treatment can cure
the patient, has turned into an undertaker who can only bury or cremate
the victim. Can the undertaker be given a different incarnation? Why
not make the undertaker the skilled surgeon operating on the emergency
room table who, through use of skills in financial management, can assist
the debtor to cope better in a society in which it is increasingly necessary
to manage one's credit as well as one's cash? If the result is a borrower
who is better educated in the art of budgeting, much will have been
achieved for society.
If we are to improve the integrity, accountability, and efficiency
of the bankruptcy system (this being one of the themes correctly referred
to in the Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in the
United States) it is necessary to provide solutions to a problem when it is
capable of being solved. It may come back to instilling old-fashioned
values, such as living within one's budget, and not incurring debt that
one cannot reasonably expect to repay: in a word, "thrift." I suggest it is
false to consider options to deal with consumer bankruptcies from the
perspective of a consumer's choice of remedies. Surely, government has
a responsibility to select the principles and values by which it wishes to
govern, and to put in place educative and legislative means to achieve
those ends. The unlucky debtor may be given a fresh start. He or she
should also get proper advice on how to remedy the problems that have
caused the bankruptcy. Bankruptcy should never be an easy option to
increase one's wealth or to avoid (by removing) problems which, with
proper management, could be solved by agreement with creditors. The
bankruptcy process should not be considered as a sticking plaster when it
could be a drug capable of curing serious illness.
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All of these issues are relevant in New Zealand today. Since
financial deregulation, New Zealanders have had to take increased
personal responsibility for payment of much of their (and their
children's) health and education costs. They have to provide for their
retirement, and are expected to invest money for that purpose knowing
that the investment may fail, and that the government will not come to
their rescue. The Employment Contracts Act 199181 has resulted in more
people working as independent contractors than as employees, and has
had both good and bad effects. Some benefits previously enjoyed by
employees have been lost. Flexibility has been gained. In New Zealand,
we do not have the problem of tort claims for personal injury, as all
personal injuries suffered through accidents are covered by the Accident
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992.82 However, the
statutory regime provides far less compensation than one could expect if
able to sue in tort. It also provides far less by way of compensation than
was originally intended when the Accident Compensation Act 197283 was
enacted.
One option for dealing with consumer bankruptcies is to catch
them earlier in the system. New Zealand has advantages in this respect
over other countries. Unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia,
New Zealand is a unitary state with a unicameral Parliament, and so
does not face the problems encountered in federal insolvency systems
because of excessive levels of exempt property allowed under state law.
New Zealand does embrace the concept of exempt property, but has
generally kept it within reasonable limits.84 At present, under both the
Matrimonial Property Act 197685 and the Joint Family Homes Act 1964,86
property levels of up to $82,000 are prescribed as protection against
creditors.8 7 New Zealanders are starting to have gambling problems.
Casinos have recently been authorized and sports betting has also been
81 Supra note 29.
82 [1992] 1 N.Z. Stat. 64, No. 13.
83 [1972 1 N.Z. Stat. 521, No. 43.
84 Examples are the modest levels of exemption for tools of trade and furniture: see Insolvency
Act 1967, supra note 1, s. 52. See also Laws NZ, supra note 1, "Insolvency," para. 255.
85 [1976] 3 N.Z. Stat. 2148, No. 166.
86 [1964] 1 NZ. Stat. 253, No. 45.
87 See Joint Family Homes (Specified Sum) Order 1996, S.R. 1996/175; and Matrimonial
Property (Specified Sum) Order 1996, S.R. 1996/176. These limits are reviewed every two years. See
also OfficialAssignee v. Lawford, [1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.).
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introduced. It will be interesting to follow the impact of these factors on
future bankruptcies in New Zealand.
VII. CONCLUSION
In my view, the objective of bankruptcy is to maximize recovery
for creditors who have lost money, while enabling an unfortunate debtor
to make a fresh start and, conversely, penalizing debtors who are guilty
of reprehensible commercial conduct. If the law becomes too pro-
debtor, there is a danger that the emphasis on rehabilitation will also
eliminate the consequences of undesirable commercial conduct. This will
mean a loss of incentives for citizens to honour their contractual
promises. The suggested introduction in the United States of measures
to prevent irresponsible lending will also be watched with interest in
New Zealand.
A balance also needs to be struck between personal insolvency
law and family law to ensure that innocent spouses and children do not
suffer unfairly through misfortune or misconduct of the debtor spouse.
Models for reform can build on the Canadian model, which
provides for budgetary counselling.88 Another option is the introduction
of more efficient methods of debt recovery. This will permit the early
identification and treatment of insolvent persons so that their affairs can
be dealt with in a manner appropriate to their individual circumstances,
taking into account the competing interests of debtor, creditor, and
society.89 This can be done by judgment creditors seeking examinations
of debtors, not for the purpose of enabling a creditor to gain priority
over other creditors but, rather, to allow an independent and
experienced person to consider the debtor's circumstances, and to
determine whether a collective enforcement mechanism will best suit the
debtor's and creditor's needs. Insolvent persons should be encouraged to
face their creditors at the earliest possible time. If they are willing to do
so, they should receive help. If they are unwilling to co-operate, then
there should be as few obstacles as possible for creditors seeking
collective administration for the benefit of all. The adoption of this
model would give greater weight to the interests of the collective body of
88 See BL4, supra note 66, Part XI and Part III, Division 2 in relation to consumer proposals.
89 See generally New Zealand, Department of Justice, Future Initiatives for the Administration
of Insolvency in New Zealand (Wellington, N.Z.: Department of Justice, 1991) at 6. This proposal is
not currently under active consideration in New Zealand, but will, I hope, be taken into account in
the insolvency law review.
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creditors than to the "first come, first served" principle, which applies to
the enforcement of judgments by individual creditors.
While it is important to recognize that constraints on public
expenditures limit the amount of investigation and administration that
can be conducted, it is also important to bear in mind the public interest
issues to which I have referred. If keeping a promise is at the heart of the
law of contract, the honouring of contractual obligations should be given
the same weight in devising a workable insolvency law.

